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The last half-decade has seen a remarkable outpouring of 
works on Justice Brandeis.I That spate of biographies contrasts 
with the simultaneous neglect of Holmes, as well as others like 
Douglas where no full-scale effort has yet been mounted. 
Why should this be so? The relationship with Frankfurter has 
attracted writers, and new materials have become available on this 
and other subjects. Then, too, Arthur Schlesinger has significantly 
revised our understanding of Brandeis's role in the New Deal years. 
Finally Mason's fine biography of Brandeis has never been consid-
ered superlative-in a class with his Stone book or Swisher's Field 
or Fairman's Miller or Beveridge's Marshall. After standing as the 
definitive biography for so long, the work has been dissected and 
evaluated and found to be vulnerable. 
All of the above is true, but it is not enough to account for all 
the new interest. The onrush of Brandeisia, in my view, reflects a 
growing conviction that he is the most significant single architect of 
the modem Court. His programmatiac influence, which affected 
the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Trade Commission, the 
Securities Exchange Commission, and the federal unemployment 
program, constitutes an institutional contribution to American life 
of exceptional note. In addition to serving as a major advisor to the 
two most creative presidents of this century, he visibly influenced 
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two major Justices even after leaving the Court. And, I shall sug-
gest, yet a third major Justice may have modelled himself on 
Brandeis. 
Brandeis remains a magnet for those who seek social reform 
without centralization, who wish to see a more equitable distribu-
tion of loaves and fishes without the creation of leviathan. He envi-
sioned efficient, hard-nosed programs managed by public-spirited 
experts, who would foster an honorable and small-scale social sys-
tem designed to enhance creativity and human dignity. The moral 
intensity of the man Roosevelt called "Isaiah", his personal dis-
interest, and his zeal for justice still remain appealing over the 
decades. 
The growing perception of Brandeis's influence comes with a 
price. He was hardly a judicial recluse. He was quietly eager to 
give advice, even signalling through emissaries the proper way to 
reach him without violating judicial proprieties. Bruce Murphy's 
The Brandeis-Frankfurter Connection portrays Brandeis as the mas-
termind and coordinator of all the New Deal agencies, something 
full-time members of the Roosevelt administration failed to do for 
their own agencies, let alone others. 
There has also been some diminution of Brandeis's reputation 
for depth and thoroughness. Brandeis's ability to master detail is 
undeniable. His ability to fathom financial statements, even falsified 
or misleading ones, is acknowledged by all. Not too surprisingly, 
though, he has been found to be less than an original economic the-
orist, something no Supreme Court Justice has claimed to be. Bran-
deis has also been seen as less a systematic thinker than a dogmatic 
pragmatist, a judge whose guideposts were more primitive, intuitive 
and stubborn than theoretically rich or empirically proven. 
This survey is an attempt to strike the balance on the Brandeis 
tradition as reflected in recent writings on him and Frankfurter. 
Additionally, a few words (including an autobiographical effort) on 
Douglas's career are included because of his self-acknowledged dis-
cipleship and imitation of Brandeis, most conspicuously in the crea-
tion of the constitutional "right of privacy." 
I 
My mentor, A. T. Mason, had a strict regimen by which he 
combined brisk efficiency with an exceptional willingness to talk 
with students. Intellectual discussions were cut short only by neces-
sity, but small talk ended quickly. I was given a special, identifiable 
knock. I could find him in the office more often after a stimulating 
discussion than a mundane one. He was working on the great Stone 
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biography, still the finest source for understanding the process of 
interactions among the brethren. To me the fascinating question 
was how Stone ended up in the Holmes-Brandeis camp. I kept 
pressing, until Mason pithily summarized his instinct on the matter: 
"He was pixilated by Holmes." 
Naturally, we discussed Brandeis. In private Mason similarly 
encapsulated the unspoken premise of the Brandeis biography. 
"Brandeis's greatness was pre-Court." Once or twice he indicated 
his puzzlement and lack of empathy for Brandeis's Zionism. He 
recalled one hot summer day when the Justice took his shirt off. 
When the topic somehow turned to Zionism, Brandeis became in-
credibly animated, eyes flashing, talking of things that Mason felt 
were remote to him, perhaps inaccessible. 
Mason's book has nonetheless held up well over the years. It 
does not have the advantages presented by Stone's exceptionally 
candid papers. But it is generally on any list of outstanding biogra-
phies and remains a model for other Brandeis scholars as well as a 
major scholarly resource for historians. 
The degree to which Mason understood not merely Brandeis's 
Zionism but even his Judaism has also been questioned directly or 
indirectly. Occasionally, too, critical comments on Mason's legal 
analyses have surfaced, perhaps reflecting Frankfurter's known 
preference for a different biographer from the one Brandeis chose to 
confide in. Inevitably, new material has come forward, both archi-
val and in monographic work. Justice Brandeis's Court-era papers 
were not available to Mason. With the passage of time, new evi-
dence has brought new issues to the fore. Questions about Bran-
deis's ethics have arisen of which Mason obviously had only 
glimmerings. Time too, provides perspective on the institutions 
Brandeis worked for, his jurisprudence and its consequences, his 
claimed loyalties, and even on his persona. 
In the end Brandeis continues to control the agenda of his bi-
ographers with his landmark achievements, his massive letters and 
writings, and his significant legal decisions. They drive out the per-
son because he withheld that even from his friends. Even the pas-
sion that everyone sensed to be so dominant in the man emerged so 
seldom that each book necessarily repeats the same few anecdotes. 
If Frankfurter was, as Harry Hirsch suggests, enigmatic, requiring 
deep-seated psychoanalysis to understand, Brandeis emerges as an 
almost mysterious, alien creature. Where, for example, Marion 
Frankfurter's problems are an open book, Alice Brandeis's were 
kept within the family. Frankfurter's ambitions were as open as his 
personality, expressed sometimes in denial as much as in affirma-
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tion. Brandeis's discretion was remarkable, his sense of family and 
privacy sharply developed; his occasional displays of passion 
seemed all the more remarkable because their sources and causation 
remained mysterious and unrevealed. 
Certainly any expectation of further revelation about Bran-
deis's personality is diminished by these recent works. Efforts to 
bring his Jewishness forward or to find some clue to his very being 
in his profound and unstinted commitment to Zionism have yielded 
a very low grade ore of understanding. A prominent constitutional 
historian has suggested that Brandeis's dogmatic-know-it-allism 
with respect to Zionism, which estranged him first from Weizmann 
and the non-American leadership and then from the rank and file of 
American Zionists, was somehow prototypic. Yet Brandeis previ-
ously had never even moved to the front of a movement, let alone 
led a schism. Only in his failure to understand ultimate human mo-
tivation-failures repeated in his equally beloved bank life insur-
ance effort, in his perpetual underestimation of the role of emotion 
and symbolism-was his Zionism career representative. 
Brandeis's failure as a Zionist leader is poorly captured in all of 
the work because the struggle continues to be treated in terms of the 
personality conflict between him and Chaim Weizmann. It was, 
however, embedded in a larger struggle with the Palestinian Kib-
butz pioneers over the balance of power between themselves and the 
donors abroad. Previous patrons of the return to Zion like Montifi-
ore and Rothschild had dominated policy. The new balance of 
power was to reduce donors to junior and preferably silent partners, 
with those taking physical risks calling the shots. The key issue-
fiscal accountability-was also an issue of power. Weizmann per-
sonally had no trouble reaching agreement with Brandeis and was 
caught himself in the demands of the pioneers. Brandeis inter-
preted Weizmann's actions as a personal betrayal, misunderstand-
ing the profound political advantage of physical danger as opposed 
to petty details such as cost accounting or even demonstrable hon-
esty. By emphasizing rational use of funds in a cause that was fun-
damentally defensible on only emotional grounds, he demonstrated 
his lack of insight into human nature. His tactics and his appeals to 
the antiseptic values of the CPA left to his opponents all the appeals 
of symbolism and political dynamism, and quickly eroded his inter-
national and American support. That he remained as fervent and 
devoted and generous to the cause as ever is a measure of the emo-
tional commitment within himself that he failed to recognize in 
others. 
At heart, Brandeis completely misunderstood his fellow Zion-
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ists. He assumed that efficiency and the proper handling of charita-
ble funds was a primary aim in a movement whose basic aims in the 
1920's were obviously Utopian and anything but cost-efficient. 
Brandeis was stirred by a sense of identity with his co-religionists, 
but that sense was personal and profoundly different from theirs. 
His biographers have struggled to understand the roots of his Zion-
ism, which has remained elusive like so much of his psyche. 
Strum suggests Brandeis projected his admiration for Athenian 
democracy on the embryonic Kibbutz movement in Palestine. Not-
ing the frequent use of Zimmern's The Greek Commonwealth in 
Brandeis's speeches (but not his Zionist ones), Strum finds confir-
mation of her thesis in a 1914 trip to Palestine made by Brandeis 
and Zimmern-a voyage the Justice took only once in his lifetime. 
The emphasis on Athenian civic individualism, she suggests, paral-
leled his admiration for a somewhat mythical Palestinian homeland. 
This fanciful point correctly captures Brandeis's value system but 
the linkage is vague at best and does not explain the initial commit-
ment, which after all was not to a place but to a cause. 
Mason gives us Brandeis's own account. Impressed by the hu-
manity, the ability to see the others' viewpoint, of Jewish manufac-
turers and workers in his garment industry experience, Brandeis 
was influenced further when he came in contact with Jacob De 
Haas, a Zionist leader who knew Brandeis's much-loved uncle. 
Nothing in these volumes improves on Mason's account. 
Gil's delightful and useful monograph, Brandeis of Boston, is 
more allusive in its evidence and arguments. Brandeis, he suggests, 
came to Boston at a time Jews were seen as exotic rarities, even as 
counterparts of the Puritan tradition. But as waves of Eastern Eu-
ropean immigrants arrived, anti-Semitism gradually eroded the 
standing of insiders like Brandeis. Brandeis made increasing use of 
the Jewish Advocate and other instruments of ethnic community 
power in the progressive cause, especially after 1910. He learned, 
Gil suggests, by observing (or opposing) the effective use of ethnic-
ity in Boston politics and turned his skills to mobilize his people, 
thus coming to identify with them. 
Gil's book is thoroughly researched and modest in its writing. 
Later Brandeis biographers, however, have not been readily per-
suaded. Gil makes much of Brandeis's limited social life as years 
went on, his failure to penetrate the inner core of Boston clubdom 
even with the sponsorship of Samuel Warren (his partner and an 
authentic Brahmin). Yet as other authors point out, there was an 
unmistakable consensus among the Bostonian elite that Brandeis 
was rejecting them, rather than the other way around. He was an 
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unusual outsider indeed, who employed a future dean of the 
Harvard Law School as a junior lawyer, helped arrange for Oliver 
Wendell Holmes's professorship, and moved easily in the most rari-
fied of literary and social circles. Certainly there is little evidence of 
affronts to Brandeis, and much stronger evidence of the polite but 
chilling sense of his reserve and self-assurance. 
Brandeis's background even separated him from most of his 
fellow Jews. More than one work refers to Brandeis's background 
as Shabbatean, which is much like referring to Mennonites simply 
as Protestants. The Frankist sect from which both sides of Bran-
deis's family (and his wife's family) came emerged from the radical 
wing of Shabbati Zvi's pseudo-messianic following. Once Frank 
was in control he repudiated the founder's main teachings. Moving 
to Poland, he nominally converted to Christianity as camouflage for 
doctrines and practices heretical to both Judaism and Christianity. 
In Bohemia and Moravia, his followers did not convert, but formed 
links to both the Jewish and Christian communities. Brandeis's 
grandmother was a Wehle and among the most prominent of the 
Frankist families.2 
Thus, Brandeis's upbringing was not merely the standard 
training of upper class continental Jews, drifting into a virtually 
non-religious humanism (the pattern of his wife's brother-in-law Fe-
lix Adler, the founder of Ethical Culture). It also reflected the in-
fluence of a mystic, charismatic leader who reveled in his ignorance 
of the traditions he had "surpassed."J The long and the short of it 
remains that Brandeis's Jewishness cannot be a key to much, be-
cause he can just barely be considered Jewish. While Zionism and 
the need to rescue German Jews after 1933 was a form of expiation 
for Frankfurter, who had a deep sense of Jewish commitment of a 
conventional sort, it was for Brandeis a very special and even artifi-
cial act. Symbolically, Frankfurter specified that Louis Henkin 
speak at his funeral and asked that he say the traditional Kaddish, 
2. Frankists were excommunicated from Judaism in many parts of Europe, especially 
after Frank and his followers supported the infamous blood libel. In Bohemia and Moravia 
however, religious links persisted. Mason says the wives of Brandeis's grandfather and great-
grandfather remained "orthodox" (probably meaning non-Frankist), and such "mixed" mar-
riages were common in that part of Europe. However, his mother's "humanism" was typical 
of that stratum ofFrankists generally. Since many of the Frankist teachings-including, as is 
common with many fringe religious sects, secret forms of sexual permissiveness-were dan-
gerous, it is interesting to speculate about a lingering family tradition of discipline and 
secrecy. 
3. Brandeis was aware of this background. It is tempting to read even more than is 
usual (and probably reasonable) into the famous occasion when he publicly espoused Zionism 
and thanked Nahum Sokolow "for reuniting me with my people." 
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while Brandeis ordered cremation, which is contrary to Jewish 
tradition.4 
II 
The biggest disappointment in these volumes is that they add 
very little to our understanding of Brandeis as a Justice. Mason's 
conclusion that Brandeis's greatness was pre-Court was a conclu-
sion reached through a veil. Of course he did not regard Justice 
Brandeis as a weak figure, and there are positive claims made for his 
judicial achievements. Bickel's Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice 
Brandeis, however, gave us new glimpses of court craftsmanship in 
the making. The Mason biography of Stone and Walter Murphy's 
Elements of Judicial Strategy gave us a sense of how Court majori-
ties are fashioned, a sense vulgarized but made familiar in the gos-
sipy The Brethren. With access to Brandeis's papers, one expects 
some of the mysteries to become clear or at least clearer. 
In general, few advances have been made. A few passionate 
and well-written chapters by Strum convey the Justice's involve-
ment with civil liberties and economic issues. Mason describes the 
passion; Strum involves the reader and even identifies with those 
views. This success, of course, did not require and does not really 
draw upon new materials. One thoughtful review praises Paper's 
Supreme Court chapters, but to my taste they are generally less pen-
etrating than Strum's and considerably less thorough than Mason's, 
although his treatment of the Olmstead case is quite fine. This is a 
disappointing harvest. 
Brandeis's role on the Court is in need of reappraisal. In pass-
ing, one of the authors refers to Justice Brandeis in a minor descrip-
tive clause as the de facto leader of the Court for over two decades. 
Not for several days did I react to this remarkable statement, and 
only then decide that it was both unusual and true. It is remarkable 
because task leaders on the Court have generally been members of 
the majority wing, usually a Chief Justice (e.g., Marshall or 
Hughes), or allied with the Chief Justice, (e.g., Brennan with War-
ren, Van Devanter or Sutherland with Taft), but, at any rate, a 
"representative member" of the largest group (e.g., Stewart or 
4. Similarly, attempting to account for Brandeis's Zionism in terms of his political 
ambitions founders on the rocks of chronology and political realities. Attempts to suggest he 
turned to Zionism after being rejected for a cabinet post, when prominent community leaders 
suggested he was not a "representative" Jew, are inaccurate as to the timing of this commit-
ment, and fail to grasp the basic unpopularity of the hyphenated-Americanism that Zionist 
affiliation entailed-not merely with the American public at the time but even with the bulk 
of the Jewish community. There were far easier, far safer, far more rewarding roads to 
Jewish community leadership for a man like Brandeis, with his skills and wealth. 
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Black). The claim that Brandeis occupied that role requires both a 
subtle restatement of the role of leader and and understanding of 
Brandeis's unique niche on the Court. Once again, he was an "out-
sider" who commanded the inside. Brandeis was not generally part 
of Taft's rump sessions that planned conservative positions in the 
1920s, still less allied with the remaining foursome or the Hughes-
Roberts twosome in the 1930s. The ingredients of his success de-
serve more attention than they have received. 
Brandeis's extreme detachment and avoidance of recrimination 
with those he could not persuade was one key ingredient. He made 
his peace with Taft, who had bitterly opposed his nomination, when 
they accidentally met in the street just after Taft's confirmation as 
Chief Justice. They repaired to Brandeis's office for a relaxed and 
boisterous conversation. Brandeis respected the integrity of Van 
Devanter and Sutherland, and the ability of the former. He never 
replied to McReynold's venom, which was perhaps a good tactic 
but more probably just Brandeis's way of dealing with malice. He 
was discreet about his colleagues except when talking to Frank-
furter. He detached himself from situations in a manner which of-
fended Harold Laski, Weizmann, and various Boston opponents, 
but generally enthralled people he worked with for any length of 
time. In short, he generally knew how to avoid giving unnecessary 
offense. 
We now know-and some of the authors perceive its signifi-
cance-that Brandeis was not only the inspirer of Frankfurter and 
Landis's The Business of the Supreme Court but that portions of his 
letters to Frankfurter are inserted in the volume much as other let-
ters miraculously appeared in The New Republic. The book was the 
outline of a program for simplifying, intensifying and strengthening 
the Court as an institution. Resistance to that jurisdictional simpli-
fication continues, but movement has also occurred toward his 
program. 
Brandeis was remarkably successful in another respect. The 
Ashwander opinion capped his quiet drive to make Thayer's abnega-
tion impulses into clear and decisive rules. The "cautionary rules" 
were of course culled from Supreme Court decisions but they were 
scattered throughout the U.S. Reports. Compiled into a tough 
statement of judicial limitations they look like a decalogue. Frank-
furter's observation at the time that it was a truly significant opinion 
looks better all the time. Yet it was done with quiet inevitability, 
not with a sense of earthshaking innovation. 
Brandeis himself felt-and Mason seems to agree-that too 
much attention was paid to dissenting opinions where Holmes, 
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Stone, Cardozo, and he simply left a trail of crumbs for other Jus-
tices to follow, while not enough attention was paid to his many 
majority opinions. In those, as well as in dissent, he helped lay the 
foundation for today's civil liberties doctrine. In technical adminis-
trative law cases Brandeis was able to establish a pragmatic primacy 
for individual freedom over property rights, a distinction that lies at 
the base of post-Carolene Products Supreme Court doctrine. By 
taking on complex economic issues and using his technical legal 
skills to handle involved matters, he earned the trust that he later 
expended in cases closer to his heart. 
Brandeis's view of federalism was, as scholars have recognized, 
more complex than popularizers realize. Much less of a national 
supremacist than Holmes or Frankfurter, Brandeis had more in 
common with Black (and, for all of his inconsistencies, with Doug-
las). The vision of local control that led him to defend social experi-
mentation and to enunciate Erie v. Tompkins remains to be 
evaluated as a program for maintenance of federalism. Unfortu-
nately, recent works have not intelligently assessed the results ex-
cept in highly general terms. 
All in all, this is a formidable list for any Justice to accomplish. 
Sorting out the relative contributions of Hughes, Holmes and Bran-
deis to the burgeoning of civil liberties has yet to be seriously at-
tempted. The forging of a new approach to state power in a more 
centralized national order was the contribution of Brandeis and 
Stone in the 1930s and of Stone, Frankfurter, and Black subse-
quently. The development of a richer tradition of abnegation, the 
unobtrusive legitimation of the use of law review articles and other 
evidence contra English tradition, all define a leader who nudged 
from within. He was a judicial architect and statesman, not merely 
a technical craftsman of rare abilities, but also a seer for his court as 
well as for society. 
III 
Undoubtedly the major change in these works is the new evi-
dence of Brandeis's off-Court involvement. Two issues arise: the 
extent of the influence and the issue of propriety. 
As indicated above, the influence of Brandeis in the "second 
New Deal" was adumbrated by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. in his defini-
tive history of FDR's administration. After the Moley-Tugwell-
Berle group had exhausted their program, and much of it had been 
repudiated by both experience and the Supreme Court, the Bran-
deis-Frankfurter team came to the fore. Schlesinger suggests that 
by 1935, Brandeis had more influence on policy than at any other 
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time in his life. This persisted until after the 1936 election. During 
these years he was able to help mold the federal program for unem-
ployment and also much of the Social Security legislation. 
How effective was the collaboration? The portrait that 
emerges from Bruce Murphy's over-publicized and inaccurate Con-
nection is that of Brandeis's office as a second White House. It is 
interesting to think of running the country in one's spare time from 
the Supreme Court. Certainly Brandeis and Frankfurter had great 
influence with Roosevelt. Yet neither was consulted on the Court-
packing plan, nor did they achieve programmatic or administrative 
control of any specific agency. 
Frankfurter's success in placing proteges was legendary. Bran-
deis was often consulted and usually was also eager to provide 
names. The network was extensive, even extraordinary. The Jus-
tice and the Professor were able to command respect, envy and in-
fluence. This is meaningful and important, but hardly the 
infiltration of some cadre of disciplined conspirators. 
Many of these proteges were, of course, Harvard law students 
of Frankfurter's, still learning to spread their wings. Once in bu-
reaucratic roles they often espoused views in variance with those of 
their sponsors. The initial recommendation often was based on 
sheer ability and perhaps the presence of some personal chemistry. 
But the Brandeis-Frankfurter letters contain constant laments over 
deviation from the path of righteousness. Given the imprecision of 
that path, even long-standing allies seemed to fall in and out of 
grace. They perhaps might seek Brandeis's delphic advice at points 
of personal passage, on taking or losing a post, or in moments of 
organizational crisis when Brandeis appears to have retained his ge-
nius for pinpointing the source of problems. There is little evidence, 
however, of either Brandeis or Frankfurter being involved in regu-
lar, continuous consultation on routine matters by even the most 
faithful or junior of the proteges. Instead, the genius of Brandeis 
and Frankfurter was most evident at the legislative drafting stage. 
With Brandeis generally providing the broad vision, Frankfurter su-
pervising and criticizing, and Corcoran and Cohen doing the trans-
lation from concept to statutory language, a team of immense talent 
structured major social institutions.s 
The best appraisal of the Brandeis-Frankfurter influence on the 
5. A side issue of some importance is that Frankfurter was abroad during the bulk of 
the time that the Securities and Exchange Act was drafted; Bruce Murphy claims to have 
been told by Corcoran that Brandeis critiqued the actual drafts. Other authors quote Corco-
ran's emphatic denials of even discussing strategy, and it seems not only out of character for 
Brandeis, but downright imprudent, and therefore highly improbable. 
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New Deal is Dawson's little monograph. The style is a bit crabbed 
and the organization occasionally mysterious, but there is judgment 
and balance throughout its few pages. Essentially Dawson con-
cludes that the personal influence of the two exceeded their ability 
to shape developments. They placed their proteges well from the 
beginning, but Frankfurter's willingness to spend the 1933-34 aca-
demic year in Oxford indicates a sense that he was not relinquishing 
decisive power. The period of their greatest power after 1935, was 
in fact a period of great frustration. The victories in Social Security 
and unemployment, and others like the ensconcement of Thurmond 
Arnold in the Anti-Trust Division of the Justice Department, were 
significant but not fundamental. 
Strum and Dawson both accept the proposition that Brandeis's 
recovery program was a comprehensive, radical plan for restructur-
ing American industry. They defend him against charges of utopi-
anism. They also record his frustration with the continued failure 
to implement his plan. Whether judged by that comprehensive 
standard or even in absolute terms, Dawson's conclusion is that the 
Frankfurter-Brandeis team experienced more defeat than failure 
and felt time running out on them. 
Most of the authors emphasize Schlesinger's more power-ori-
ented approach over Dawson's programmatic assessment. Indeed 
they make no particular assessment of the relative contribution of 
Brandeis as between the Wilson and Roosevelt years.6 The excep-
tion is Bruce Murphy who attributes immense and pervasive influ-
ence to the Brandeis-Frankfurter team. 
The Murphy volume implies, insinuates, denigrates, but never 
assesses. A smarmy disclaimer toward the end of the book suggests 
that there is no intention to discredit the Justices but every page 
attempts to do just that. Robert Cover demonstrated Murphy's in-
ability to read sources, but virtually every other book has a different 
statement repudiating or vigorously questioning Murphy's use of 
data. These cut to the heart of his imputation of influence. The 
evidence in his book for a sustained day-to-day influence is scanty, 
and his ability to judge evidence is seriously in question. 
Nevertheless, Murphy has been successful in raising and focus-
ing on serious questions about the norms expected of a Justice with 
respect to off-Court activity. The lurid tone of his book and the 
popular reviews generated widespread interest. The focus on "ethi-
6. Strum even throws in Brandeis's casual relationship with Truman to suggest yet a 
third President who might have been influenced by the Justice. This trivialization of evidence 
could be carried further. Hoover was in fact indebted to Brandeis in his career, but when 
Hoover consulted him on the Depression Brandeis was unable to influence him at all. 
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cal" behavior when the issues are largely propriety, prudence and 
demeanor is only partly of Murphy's making. But it leads to a mor-
alism that is not justified by circumstances. There is no charge of 
cupidity or personal aggrandizement, and Murphy's most serious 
allegations have failed to hold up. 1 
We must not lose sight of the fact that the articulated norms of 
today are so stringent precisely because of the efforts of Brandeis 
and Frankfurter. Murphy acknowledges this but also suggests that 
their departure from their articulated norms involved hypocrisy. 
Their behavior did suggest some possible tensions between aspira-
tions and reality. Brandeis had a penchant for evading his self-im-
posed monkishness so long as the proper formalities were observed. 
Frankfurter clearly did things he publicly deplored (much as he de-
nied missing class at Harvard), and was obviously troubled by some 
of his contradictions. Freedman reports that a bitter argument with 
Hand over Jackson's role in Nuremberg altered Frankfurter's views 
about extrajudicial activities, and this reappraisal must have further 
troubled him. 
It must also be borne in mind that the off-court activity of 
Brandeis and Frankfurter was quite modest by historical standards. 
Justices have never insulated themselves from political life. In mod-
ern terms Stone, Taft, Vinson, Douglas, Byrnes, and Fortas are 
among those who retained active, advisory political roles, much as 
Frankfurter did, and much more overtly than Brandeis. Presidents 
often put confidants on the Court, and giving advice to Presidents is 
a powerful narcotic; withdrawal symptoms are clearly evident in 
newspapers and memoirs. s 
As a passionate and socially involved person, yet capable of 
extraordinary objectivity and great institutional loyalty, Brandeis 
developed a careful code, not to evade but to live within those con-
straints. As to Court business, Brandeis was extraordinarily dis-
creet, confiding only to Frankfurter his inevitable frustrations. His 
occasional departures-the famous message to FDR blurted out to 
Corcoran after the Schechter decision, and the unfortunate partici-
7. Murphy suggested that Brandeis did not recuse himself over the Lever Act when he 
"helped on strategy." Critics have demonstrated that Murphy extrapolated from published 
sources and failed to do elementary checking. On this matter he falls far below any reason-
able line of professional care. He was also wrong about Brandeis's role in drafting SEC 
legislation. He also suggested that Brandeis was forced to recuse himself in the Sacco-
Venzetti case because of his involvement with Frankfurter. This is highly questionable, since 
Brandeis gave a convincing reason that did not involve Frankfurter. 
8. Brandeis was rather more directly involved with Wilson than with Roosevelt, even 
helping to write a pro-Wilson manifesto in 1920. It is not inconceivable, though, that he 
thought this an obligatory and harmless gesture for an exhausted and terminally ill friend and 
benefactor. 
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pation in Hughes's letter on the Court plan which Frankfurter 
properly found so indefensible-are remarkably few and occurred 
during periods of frustration. Occasional and intermittent advice of 
a generalized nature left him uncommitted as to specifics that would 
have endangered his ability to be (or to appear to be) dispassionate. 
Brandeis obviously did not feel he had to curb his enthusiasm for 
causes or even programs so long as he avoided the specific statute or 
concrete administrative action. His decision rules were, it would 
appear, sharp and decisive. His private involvement was kept vague 
enough to avoid involving him in a litigation-prone situation. His 
public participation was even more restrictive, avoiding so far as 
practicable any intimation of involvement. 
Murphy's treatment of Frankfurter suggests that his articu-
lated standards were even more severe and that his violations, par-
ticularly with respect to service to Roosevelt, were obvious even to 
himself. Thus he actively advised the Treasury Department on the 
wording of wartime tax measures. Frankfurter must have excused a 
good deal of this on patriotic grounds. 
According to Murphy, Frankfurter pettifogged on the issue in 
letters and speeches. Once again, however, Murphy undermines 
his own credibility. He accuses Frankfurter of disingenuousness in 
denying a Forrestal Diaries entry. Frankfurter's denial addresses 
whether he and Justice Murphy sent messages to the Philippine 
delegate to the U.N. urging partition of Palestine. The diary, Mur-
phy asserts, actually accuses Frankfurter of lobbying the Philippine 
President. A look at the Diaries (p. 358), however, shows precisely 
the contrary. It is difficult to condone such carelessness when the 
incident is vaunted as the main example of the Justice's dishonesty. 
By far the most publicized allegation, Murphy linked annual 
payments by Brandeis to Frankfurter after the latter experienced 
financial difficulties, largely due to Marion Frankfurter's psycholog-
ical problems. Brandeis proffered the sums so Frankfurter would 
not have to resort to legal moonlighting and could continue to work 
for social causes, which often required travel and other out-of-
pocket expenses. The subsidy, routinely paid once a year by Bran-
deis's secretary, ended when Frankfurter became a Justice.9 Mur-
phy's thesis earmarks this as an attempt by Brandeis to subvert the 
limits on political activity by Justices. Frankfurter was his chosen 
instrument and the hired hand. 
This interpretation seems at odds with what we know of the 
9. Baker, who gives the fullest account, suggests it really was not annual but rather 
occasional until 1925; Strum is ambiguous, while Murphy clearly states it was consistently 
paid from 1916 on. 
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two men as individuals and their interaction. As Cover points out, 
even Murphy argued in an early paper that the context of the 
friendship suggested the innocence of the arrangement. The facts 
suggest that both viewed the matter solely as an appropriate act of 
friendship: the arrangement was not secret; Justice Brandeis re-
tained the records; and Frankfurter preserved the relevant papers. 
Frankfurter was quixotic if not perverse about money. He 
turned down a $1500 payment for his significant research in the 
landmark Cleveland Crime Study, shortly before requesting sums 
from Brandeis. He believed a professor should not moonlight. He 
could easily have sold his skills to a law firm. His peculiar attitude 
toward money is reflected in his failure to provide for his widow, an 
act so outlandish that it provides much better support for Hirsch's 
psychoanalytic view of Frankfurter than anything found in that bi-
ography. The man who tutored rich students for free in his law 
school days never exhibited cupidity, as opposed to fascination with 
power and social position. 
More than that, for all of their essential harmony of views, 
Frankfurter had strong differences with Brandeis (as well as ex-
traordinary personal independence in other aspects of his life such 
as his role at Harvard) that would seem to preclude the role Mur-
phy suggests. His siding with Holmes (and the conservatives) in the 
famous New Republic critique of Meyer v. Nebraska put him at odds 
with Brandeis on a question at the core of Brandeis's being. On the 
Court-packing fight Frankfurter pulled his punches, but conveyed 
his unhappiness with Brandeis's role. Both agreed to disagree, but 
Brandeis was at the least equally conciliatory. 
In short, like almost everyone except Bruce Murphy, I see no 
evidence of evil in the Brandeis-Frankfurter connection and only an 
occasional violation of proprieties by either Justice. Some of those 
were serious but not out of line with the behavior of their immediate 
contemporaries. The higher line they espoused is now firmly estab-
lished as expected behavior. 
Brandeis's institutional analysis was generally wiser and more 
perceptive than his concept of propriety. It came, to be sure, in a 
generation when emphasis on public behavior was primary; it was 
then far worse for a judge to be observed in a restaurant with a 
woman not his wife than to abuse witnesses in court. Brandeis cor-
rectly fathomed that probity is essentially personal, and that each 
Justice had to work his or her own way on these matters.to 
10. This obvious point has been driven home to me not just from service on a judicial 
disciplinary commission, but from recent experience at a Washington dinner. At the cocktail 
hour a distinguished court of appeals judge, whom I have known slightly for many years, 
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Given the highly individualized natures of the Justices and the 
intricacies of their temperaments, criticizing Brandeis becomes a bit 
of a fool's game. Fundamentally though, I conclude that the cur-
rent judges have it sized up better .II Less circumspection in public 
appearances and greater abstention from private arm-twisting seems 
a sounder practice. Why should not liberal judges, with reasonable 
circumspection, speak to the underlying issues of the era, while 
avoiding the tactical skirmishes of the day? We are told often of the 
magnificent objectivity and circumspection of the English judge, but 
it is rare for a week's coverage of the London Times not to include a 
speech by a judge calling for stronger family ties, stricter punish-
ment or some other buttress of conventional values. If Brandeis 
found it easy to permit a new edition of Other People's Money in 
1934, why should he not also have written a book expressing his 
distaste for the values of the 1920s? 
On the obverse side, we have good deeds, patriotic service, pre-
sumably selfless contributions done by the Justices in stealth. There 
is no possible corrective, no right of criticism if the society would 
have evaluated those stealthy good deeds differently and negatively. 
Arguing as I do, that it is propriety or even institutional prudence, 
but not ethics, that is fundamentally at stake, I am painfully aware 
of the artificial nature of the boundary. 
IV 
When Brandeis retired from the Court in 1939 he was suc-
ceeded by William 0. Douglas. Frankfurter had taken his seat a 
indicated it would be improper to answer my question about the date of decision for a well-
publicized case. We proceeded to have dinner at which a Supreme Court Justice, to illustrate 
a point, told us of a minor case that would be announced in 48 hours, presumably relying on 
both our discretion and the relative obscurity of the case. 
II. One of the difficulties in analyzing "off-Court activity" is that it is a hodgepodge. 
Few quarrel with judges suggesting names for judgeships or other legal posts. Similarly, 
advice during war crises or participation in international issues that are unlikely to involve 
the Court have not been widely disapproved. A substantial amount of Brandeis's Court-time 
involvement with Wilson and Frankfurter's with Roosevelt falls under this heading. Much of 
this consultation was the tapping of organizational expertise. Their open Zionist involve-
ment, as well as that of Judge Mack, was also seen as the equivalent of commitment to the 
United Nations or the Sons of Norway. Conversely, involvement in partisan politics and 
ambition for office seems the clearest threat to Court independence. Even so, Hughes, Field, 
and Douglas are only a few of the great Justices who were involved in serious presidential 
speculation. Aiding in political campaigns is also objectionable; both Justice Brandeis and 
Frankfurter, especially the latter, have lapsed there. In general the Justices now frown on 
taking on other duties for reasons of burden as well as propriety, so that the matter has been 
muted, though not mooted. The Justices have moved a bit the other way with respect to 
discussion of public issues. So long as they avoid discussion of specifics and personalities, 
they seem to feel that public issues, particularly those impinging on judicial matters, are fair 
game. Douglas was outspoken and sui generis, but among others Warren, Burger, Stevens, 
Brennan, Black and Blackmun have felt free to address policy issues in public forums. 
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few days earlier but Brandeis's infirmities kept the two from sharing 
many of the joys of collegiality. Both Frankfurter and Douglas 
were self-described Brandeis disciples. As history unfolded, the two 
became both ideological and personal foes, disagreeing acutely on 
everything but perhaps especially on those matters most precious to 
Brandeis himself. The personal antipathy of Frankfurter and 
Douglas was in part a product of their failure to agree on new solu-
tions to the new constitutional riddles that surfaced with the resolu-
tion of the older issues. 
The works on Frankfurter and Douglas are worlds apart in 
approach and sophistication. Aided by Frankfurter's own collec-
tions, letters and reminiscences his biographers give us meaty mate-
rial. Justice Douglas's own autobiographical efforts have been so 
popular that apparently biographers have been discouraged from 
competing. Simon demonstrates decisively, however, that the mis-
leading image Douglas has projected necessitates a full-scale 
biography. 
The Frankfurter works are solid achievements precisely be-
cause each is purposive and limited, rather than a full-scale book 
hiding in a monograph fighting to free itself. Parrish's fine first vol-
ume is more nearly a full-scale effort but it is devoted mainly to 
Frankfurter's intellectual and policy affiliations and their roots. It 
is thoughtful, careful and useful. The projected second volume is 
eagerly awaited. 
Harry Hirch's Enigma has some of the aura of controversy 
that surrounds Bruce Murphy's work. To an outsider it is difficult 
to see why it arouses so much emotion. The volume is meticulously 
researched and highly informative. The thesis is simple, even sim-
ple-minded. Frankfurter, he suggests, did not resolve formative 
conflicts-with his parents, over his Jewishness and physical stat-
ure, and with his wife's ambivalence and reluctance to marry-and 
these unresolved issues conditioned his mature relations. (In ex-
plaining this much to an acutely perceptive law professor social-
scientist, I elicited the penetrating and definitive, "what else is 
true?") 
Hirsch, however, ventures beyond this typical Eriksen analysis. 
He suggests that Frankfurter went on the Court fully expecting to 
be its leader. When unexpected challenges to his dominance 
emerged, the fault-lines in his personality cracked. He abandoned 
his liberalism and became a conservative due to the discrepancy be-
tween his self-image and the realities imposed by the challenges to 
his leadership. 
On the whole, this thesis seems unconvincing for psychological 
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and historical reasons as well as in terms of legal doctrine.12 In a 
sense, Mark Silverstein's Constitutional Faith solidly refutes Hirsch 
from the standpoint of legal analysis. After a somewhat stultifying 
and tedious set of introductions to law, the courts, and what not, 
Silverstein gets down to serious writing. His thesis is that Justices 
bring well-developed mind sets, "constitutional faiths," to the 
Court. Frankfurter's, he concludes, was no more malleable than 
Black's. He finds that Frankfurter's distrust of judicial activism 
was a consistent value also expressed in pre-Court years, not one he 
developed in hostility to Douglas or Murphy. 
Neither Hirsch nor Silverstein deal directly with the Brandei-
sian influence on Frankfurter. Hirsch seems to suggest that as a 
Justice, Frankfurter departed from the Brandeis path, while Silver-
stein indirectly indicates that Frankfurter had always had poten-
tially significant differences with his friend and mentor. In 
particular, Frankfurter seems to have placed even greater weight on 
the expertise of the professional, the scientific and dispassionate en-
gineer of consensus. Brandeis, too, reflected this faith in rationalist 
fact-finding which was after all, part of the Zeitgeist. Yet he seems 
to have recognized more fully than did Frankfurter the pragmatics 
of choice, the existentialist need to act on a hunch or a simple 
weight-of-the evidence test (rather than objective, established social 
decision theory). 
Douglas has not yet attracted the same caliber of biographers 
or biographies. Durham's Justice William 0. Douglas is a compe-
tent enough treatment but too hurried. In a little over a hundred 
pages, he attempts to outline a many-faceted life, analyze his 
achievements as a Justice, and still squeeze in fifty pages on Douglas 
as conservationist and world citizen. Douglas' own writing looms 
far more luminous and vivid by comparison. 
Simon's book, though a bit journalistic, tells us why Douglas's 
books have such a powerful appeal. As Simon works through the 
details of Douglas' life, it becomes the chronicle of a man who ro-
manticized virtually every detail, and who found it necessary to em-
bellish even the most extraordinary aspects of his remarkable life. 
It is tempting to say that Simon's book should have been written by 
Hirsch, that Douglas's is a biography that can only be written as 
psychobiography. It is only fair to say that whatever weaknesses 
12. Psychologically it is interesting enough to note that Frankfurter's Harvard Law 
School experience was remarkably parallel to his Supreme Court pattern. He was a favorite 
when he came to Cambridge and left as an embattled faculty member with especially bitter 
thoughts about his erstwhile ally Roscoe Pound. Far from driving him to conservatism the 
experience seems to have made him more forthright and open in his academic and social 
liberalism. 
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the book has, Simon succeeds in establishing Douglas's own unreli-
ability, a contribution that any biographer should be proud of. 
Many of the anecdotes we know so well are doubtful, including 
the different versions of where or how Douglas was almost killed 
riding the rails. Far from taking a strong stand for the realists at 
Columbia, Douglas bargained well for himself, first to stay and later 
to go to Yale in a clear career advance. Little airing of progressive 
attitudes was publicly evident until the New Deal offered good op-
portunities for progressives. There is nothing discreditable about 
those years of struggle, indeed there is much that reflects well 
enough on the young Douglas. It is merely that on most matters he 
wove a story well beyond reality. 
Simon indicates that Douglas's adherence to a Brandeisian per-
spective was a late development and perhaps as superficial as it was 
sudden. That seems unfair. Whether in any sense Douglas derived 
his viewpoint from Brandeis, the parallels in their thinking were 
remarkable. His regulatory approach at the SEC involved aggres-
sive structural reform of business but strong opposition to central-
ized bureaucracy. On the Court he was consistent in that direction, 
as well as maintaining a federalist viewpoint that was less national-
istic than Frankfurter's or Stone's (and far less than that of Jack-
son). In his environmentalism emphasis and in staking out the right 
of privacy as his primary contribution to constitutional law, Doug-
las followed his own impulses while remaining fully conscious of the 
parallels with Brandeis. Methodologically, his insistence on eco-
nomic evidence and his piercing legal mind were also points of kin-
ship, although his later indifference to craftsmanship increasingly 
marked him as different from Brandeis, who honed his later deci-
sions as carefully as his first ones. 
If in his years as a Justice he was less lavish in his homage to 
Isaiah, he paid him far more devotion in the deed, in his choice of 
issues. Keen observers of Douglas's intellectual growth such as 
Leon Epstein and Thomas Emerson accept the Justice's attribution 
of influence from Brandeis. Simon's judgment seems more a prod-
uct of a leery skepticism and less a source for new or genuine infor-
mation. In short, if Douglas was not a Brandeisian, he could hardly 
have done much more to convince us he was one. 
Functionally, neither Douglas nor Frankfurter played the role 
on their Courts that Brandeis did. Douglas did not try to conciliate 
very often nor was he an institutional visionary. Frankfurter tried 
to assume the mantle, but he was, as he had been at Harvard, both 
too episodic and too abrasive to be unifying a force for long-range 
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goals; unlike Brandeis he lacked the skills of self-effacement, pa-
tience, and grace in the face of defeat. 
The Justice who filled the vacancy, Justice Black, was like 
Brandeis, a majority leader from a minority wing, even from the 
extreme wing, of the Court. For a brief period he was slightly out-
flanked (and protected) by the Rutledge-Murphy team, but even 
then he was not a Justice of the center as most task leaders have 
been. He asserted his control of the rules (rather than habitual, 
conventional deference) by dissenting from per curiam decisions, 
much as Brandeis refashioned opinion writing by the quieter, but 
still frowned-upon practice of citing law reviews. Black also devel-
oped long-range doctrinal approaches after involved contemplation, 
careful evaluation, and testing. He used courtesy as both a weapon 
and a shield; his fierce obedience to judicial proprieties was unspar-
ing, even stretching to punishment of his own family for minor in-
cursions. Although he mastered neither economics nor history he 
aspired at least to the latter. (His son makes it clear that he believed 
in his historical writing in Adamson and was deeply offended by 
what he thought was a Frankfurterian plot to discredit him through 
the famous Fairman refutation.) 
These clothes fit the man. I am not suggesting they were 
Brandeisian hand-me-downs. At the same time, Black had been 
subject to withering and even public scorn by Chief Justice Stone, 
and seared to his very soul by the public outcry over the Ku Klux 
Klan membership. In remodeling himself to live down these slurs 
he could not have seen himself as the aloof scholar skewering others 
with pithy erudition. But he had a granite-like, patient devotion to 
an individualistic America. Silverstein's portrait of Black's consti-
tutional faith continuously reminds us that Black's view of social 
realities was essentially Brandeisian. As important as their differ-
ences on legal method were, there were also important points of 
congruence, particularly in their perception of economic royalties. 
The conventional view is that the Holmes-Brandeis tradition 
disintegrated with the emergence of new issues before the Court. 
There is much truth to this. This disintegration is clearest with re-
spect to Holmes's influence. Once his most significant contribu-
tion-judicial restraint in economic issues--ceased to be 
problematic, his personal appeal and influence diminished and has 
continued to diminish. But Brandeis introduced a broader judicial 
agenda on which disagreements continue, often in his name. He 
also was a significant institutional innovator. His legacy to the 
Court is neither substantively nor institutionally inferior to his Wil-
son year accomplishments. 
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What of the extra-Court legacy? The institutions created in 
the Wilson and Roosevelt eras are social monuments and contribute 
to a decentralized pluralistic society. If bank insurance is a failure 
and the FfC has not fulfilled its promise, the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, the SEC, and the unemployment system have become anchors 
for economic and social stability. Brandeis is in a class with the 
leading founding fathers as an architect of the American system. 
Brandeis was also the spiritual father of an important stream of 
leftist thought and action in America. Here the verdict is not so 
favorable. When the Brandeis plan for recovery failed and when no 
important champion of the Brandeisian vision emerged, that wing 
of the American left disintegrated. Both Survey and Collier have 
gone the way of good magazines, and the New Republic is primarily 
concerned with foreign policy. The consumer movement is split be-
tween those developing finer tastes in consumption and those who 
wish a more radical transformation of American society than Bran-
deis would have been happy with. 
As Dawson suggests, failure to achieve primary goals at times 
of maximum power is particularly demoralizing. Was that failure 
due to the inadequacy of the analysis, as Schlesinger suggests, or the 
inherent improbability of achieving large-scale structural reform 
through elite intrigue? That historical failure still requires clarifica-
tion. But the lack of public, vocalized, and integrated thinking has 
contributed to the disintegration of that stream of progressive 
thought. For a while Brandeisian ideas were reintroduced into the 
campaign rhetoric of Eugene McCarthy and George McGovern by 
Richard Goodwin. Their shock-value and novelty attracted atten-
tion. The failure to generate a sustained analysis, however, has left 
the Brandeis approach orphaned. For those purposes it does not 
matter whether it was flawed ab ova or has degenerated because 
successors have failed to maintain it. 
Based on these works, then, a new balance sheet should be tal-
lied. Brandeis's greatness was both pre-Court and on-Court. His 
influence off-Court during the New Deal years was significant, but 
his inability to convert that power into programmatic change repre-
sents a profound final failure as a social reformer. His self-imposed 
public reticence weakened his-and his causes' -political and ideo-
logical influence for the future. Perhaps not coincidentally, that 
same period also marks his biggest mistakes on Court. 
